Siliguri Corridor, flanked by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh has emerged as the most important national security concern for India. Dr. Vimal Khawas calls for the establishment of Siliguri Corridor Integrated Management Authority (SCIMA) for its holistic management.

The Siliguri Corridor, a small piece of land in northern West Bengal, measuring roughly 60 kilometres in length and 20 kilometres in width and covering an approximate area of 1,200 square kilometres remains one of India’s most consequential geographical features. Popularly known as the “Chicken’s Neck,” this narrow passage serves as the sole continuous overland link between the eight northeastern states and the rest of the country. Its strategic location, historical formation, geopolitical sensitivities, and growing economic and environmental weight together make it far more than a transit zone. It is a national artery whose integrity underpins territorial cohesion, regional influence, and sustainable development in eastern India.

The Corridor’s present shape emerged from successive historical processes. The Partition of 1947 left only a thin land bridge after the creation of East Pakistan. Internal boundary adjustments under the Transfer of Territories Act of 1956 actually refined its contours by transferring territory from Bihar to West Bengal. The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 closed many alternative routes and elevated the Corridor to the status of an indispensable lifeline. Earlier colonial conflicts and treaties, including the Anglo-Gorkha War, the Duar War, and the treaties of Sugauli and Punakha, had already highlighted the area’s topographic importance. In the decades after Independence, the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal reinforced free movement across the northern borders, while restricted transit through Bangladesh solidified the Corridor’s exclusive role in connecting the Northeast to the Indian mainland.

The region’s hydrology has itself been profoundly shaped by natural upheavals. A major avulsion of the Teesta River in 1787, triggered by catastrophic monsoon flooding, permanently altered its course. Previously flowing southward through channels such as the Punarbhaba, Atrai and Karatoya toward the Ganges, the river shifted southeast to join the Brahmaputra and fundamentally reshaped the alluvial landscape of the Corridor and its surrounding plains. This historical instability continues to define the area’s vulnerability. The devastating floods of October 1968 caused by intense cloudbursts and prolonged rainfall over the Darjeeling-Sikkim Himalaya triggered hundreds of landslides, washed away critical bridges including the Anderson Bridge on the Teesta severed road and rail links between Siliguri and the hills and claimed hundreds of lives while inundating large parts of the North Bengal plains. More recently, the glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) of 3-4 October 2023 from South Lhonak Lake in Sikkim sent a massive surge of water and sediment cascading hundreds of kilometres down the Teesta destroyed the Teesta-III hydropower dam, damaged infrastructure across Sikkim and downstream districts of West Bengal near the Corridor, and extended impacts into Bangladesh. These events clearly highlight that the Corridor’s narrow geography is not only a product of political cartography but also of a dynamic and often violent fluvial and climatic regime.

Wedged between Nepal and Bhutan to the north and Bangladesh to the south, and lying in proximity to China’s Chumbi Valley, the Corridor occupies a uniquely sensitive position. The Mahananda and Teesta rivers add hydrological complexity, while the narrow width means that any sustained disruption, including military, natural, or demographic, could effectively isolate the Northeast. This geography has long rendered the Corridor both indispensable for the movement of people, goods, and armed forces and inherently vulnerable to external pressure or internal instability. Geopolitically, the passage sits at the confluence of multiple interests. It is the primary land gateway through which India advances connectivity and influence toward Southeast Asia. At the same time, its open borders with three neighbouring countries create persistent challenges of illegal immigration, trafficking, and the movement of hostile elements. Often reported demographic shifts in the surrounding districts and the Corridor’s nearness to Chinese territory further intensify strategic calculations, making secure control over this strip inseparable from the defence of the Northeast and the stability of India’s eastern frontier.

Besides its geopolitical and strategic significance, the Corridor also holds tremendous geo-economic and geo-environmental importance that demands equal attention. It functions as a key route for the trade and transportation of goods between mainland India and the northeastern states, as well as with neighbouring countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Improved road, rail, and logistics networks through Siliguri have transformed the region into a commercial hub that sustains economic activity across the Northeast. The Corridor likewise plays a crucial role in promoting tourism to the northeastern states, destinations celebrated for their rich biodiversity, scenic beauty, and cultural heritage. By enabling easier access for visitors, it supports local livelihoods and strengthens the broader case for regional integration and investment.

This unique geographical piece of land is simultaneously an ecological hotspot harbouring diverse flora and fauna. It serves as a crucial elephant corridor, facilitating the seasonal movement of these animals between India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Dense forests and extensive tea gardens provide habitat for numerous species, contributing substantially to the region’s biodiversity. Yet increasing human activity including urban expansion, infrastructure projects, and intensified agriculture, poses a significant threat to this ecological balance. The Corridor’s vulnerability to climate-induced natural disasters, illustrated so starkly by the 1787 Teesta avulsion, the 1968 floods, and the 2023 GLOF, further exacerbates the environmental challenges facing the region. Any long-term strategy for the Corridor must therefore reconcile security and connectivity needs with the preservation of its fragile ecosystems and the management of recurrent fluvial hazards.

Against this layered backdrop of history, strategy, economy, and ecology, Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s statements during his recent visit to Siliguri have brought focused attention to the practical requirements of safeguarding the Corridor. He described the Siliguri Corridor as one of the most sensitive and critical zones in the country, connecting eight northeastern states to the rest of India and therefore is vital for national security. Shah directed security and administrative agencies to take strict action to stop illegal immigration. He advised authorities to keep the land free of illegal encroachments. He further instructed agencies to expand their local footprint by establishing more official institutions in the region. On the operational side, he highlighted plans for a triangular security grid built around three new military garrisons at Dhubri in Assam, Kishanganj in Bihar, and Chopra in West Bengal. These bases are intended to strengthen surveillance, presence, and response capacity around the Chicken’s Neck. Complementing this structure, Shah pushed for an integrated defence model that brings together local community intelligence, the civil administration, state police, and central military forces. He also called on local leadership to strengthen civil defence units, home guards, NCC cadets, and Sainik schools in North Bengal and recognised that durable security rests on both professional forces and an engaged civilian foundation.

While these directives correctly identify the urgency of hardening physical control and improving inter-agency coordination, they largely remain incomplete if treated solely as a security-centric package. An implementable policy complement would be the formal establishment of a Siliguri Corridor Integrated Management Authority (SCIMA), a statutory body under the Ministry of Home Affairs with representation from the Ministries of Defence, Environment, Forest and Climate Change, and Development of North Eastern Region, as well as the governments of West Bengal, Assam, and Bihar. Critically, the very idea of the Siliguri Corridor remains rather vague in official discourse. Its precise spatial limits have never been formally delineated beyond approximate descriptions of length and width. SCIMA’s first mandate must therefore be a scientifically grounded cadastral and geospatial exercise to define the Corridor’s exact boundaries, incorporating hydrological, ecological, and infrastructural criteria rather than relying on informal cartographic conventions. Parallel to this, the Authority should commission a rigorous, transparent demographic study of the delineated zone. Recent comments by Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma which have highlighted substantial demographic shifts and suggested that significant portions of the Corridor and its adjoining areas are now inhabited by populations of Bangladeshi origin, emphasis the necessity of evidence-based examination rather than rhetorical assertion.

Such a study, conducted with due process and independent oversight, would provide the empirical foundation for targeted enforcement against illegal immigration while distinguishing long-settled Indian citizens from recent irregular entrants. SCIMA would further operationalise the triangular grid and multi-agency model by embedding continuous ecological monitoring and disaster-risk assessment linked to land-use regulation. In addition, SCIMA would create a structured community-intelligence interface that institutionalises civil defence, home guards, NCC, and local institutions as permanent partners. Without this institutional layer, the risk remains that kinetic measures will outpace the social and environmental foundations upon which long-term control ultimately depends.

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Regional significance

Teesta Basin forms a part of the larger Brahmaputra Basin in the Eastern Himalaya. The river drains a total geographical area of about 12159 km². Around 2004 km² of the basin (about 17 percent) area lies in Bangladesh with the rest being in India. The Eastern Himalaya is considered as an important global ‘biodiversity hotspot’.

The region besides being source of varied forms of natural/bio-resources also acts as a global ecological sink. The basin currently is home to more than 30 million souls representing several social groups in Sikkim, northern West Bengal (India) and Bangladesh. Starting from the Lepcha Tribe, Ethnic Bhutias and the Ethnic Nepalis in Sikkim-Darjeeling Himalaya to the agrarian communities of North Bengal and Bangladesh, the region is the source of livelihood for several socio-cultural groups. Moreover, the basin has been source of etho-cultural and ethno-religious basis for many social groups in Darjeeling-Sikkim region since historic past.

Further, Teesta is the primary source of water to the agricultural crops of the thirsty Northern Bengal and North Western Bangladesh. Besides, other associated livelihood options including rafting, sand/stone mining and fishing also have thrived across the basin since long. Teesta basin, therefore, provides significant human and environmental security to the region and its geography milieu.

Climate Change and Teesta’s Hydro Burden

Climate change has been at the centre of the debate for the changing Himalayan geo-environment. Scientists are repeatedly warning that the Himalaya are warming comparatively faster than their lowland counterparts. The rapidly warming Himalaya has led to an acceleration of various geomorphic processes, including melting of glaciers. The rapid melting of glaciers has further given rise to many potentially dangerous Glacial Lakes, in recent times. The changes in the geomorphic processes have been rapid and dam planners/engineers were unable to foresee their increasing intensity and frequency over 25 years ago when many of the dams in Sikkim-Darjeeling hills were planned. 

In view of the inherent vulnerability of the Himalaya to various environmental, geomorphic and geologic process; scientists, researchers and activists had been warning about the unplanned and haphazard hydro development in Sikkim-Darjeeling hills for over two decades. The Governments, both Central and State,  and development proponents, however, dismissed the concerns communicated through scientific reports, papers and other means as fear mongering. They hardly take researchers and research papers seriously. Science and policy hardly work in coordination in India.  Consequently, Sikkim and Darjeeling catchment of the Teesta basin were dotted with many mega hydropower projects during much of the 2000s and 2010s. In fact, Sikkim today has one of the highest densities of hydropower projects in the country.

It is also important to understand that the Sikkim-Darjeeling Himalaya being a backward and less-researched region did not have long-term data on the table when many dams were planned and designed in the early 2000s. That is the reason why anti-dam activists often question the technical, environmental and human procedures followed by the proponents of hydropower dams in the Himalayan region including in Sikkim.  

Approval to Reconstruct the washed away Teesta-III

On October 3, 2023, the South Lhonak glacial lake in Sikkim burst causing a Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) and reportedly killing 179 people, displacing thousands, and affecting over 100,000 of the population in Sikkim and downstream Darjeeling hills. The flood also washed away the 1,200 MW Teesta-III Dam located 55 km downstream at Chungthang. The lake that outburst its dam was one among many potentially dangerous glacial lakes in the Sikkim Himalaya.

Less than 15 months  after the GLOF ravaged major parts of Sikkim-Darjeeling Himalaya and washed away a 60-metre-high rockfill concrete dam of the 1200-MW Teesta-III hydel project, an environment ministry panel has cleared a proposal to build a new 118.64-m-high concrete gravity dam in its place. The proposal by Sikkim Urja Ltd, the project operator, was approved by the Environment Ministry’s Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on January 10. Reportedly, the EAC nod for the new dam comes in the backdrop of concerns the panel had itself raised over the structure’s safety and stability. The reconstruction plan broadly includes:

• New Design: The rebuilt dam will be a 118.64-meter-tall concrete gravity dam, replacing the previous concrete face rockfill dam. This change aims to provide greater resilience against flash floods and GLOFs.
• Increased Spillway Capacity: The spillway capacity will be significantly increased to handle potential extreme flood events, including those caused by GLOFs.
• Early Warning System: A robust Early Warning System (EWS) will be implemented to monitor glacial lakes and provide timely alerts for potential floods.
• Safety Measures: Worker safety will be improved by relocating the dam control room to a higher elevation.

However, Teesta-III dam reconstruction plan has faced significant criticism from the experts and antidam activists primarily due to concerns about safety and environmental impact following the devastating glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) of  October 3, 2023 that destroyed the dam.

Major points of criticism may be highlighted as under:

• Safety Concerns: Critics argue that the reconstruction plan does not adequately address the risks of future GLOFs, especially given the increasing frequency of such events due to climate change. They point out that the new dam design, while claiming increased spillway capacity, lacks sufficient credible data to validate these claims.
• Lack of Updated Assessments: The environmental ministry has approved the reconstruction without insisting on updated environmental and hydrological assessments, including a revised probable maximum flood (PMF) assessment, which is considered crucial in light of the changed circumstances.
• Bypassing Public Hearing: The decision to bypass a fresh public hearing is seen as a disregard for democratic principles and the rights of the local people, especially considering that the previous hearing was held in 2006 and does not reflect the current realities or the impact of disasters.
• Impact on Fragile Ecosystem: The reconstruction in a fragile Himalayan ecosystem raises concerns about long-term environmental consequences and the safety of the people in the face of potential future GLOFs and similar disasters.
• Community Concerns: Local communities have raised concerns about the project’s impact on their lives and livelihoods, as well as the potential risks of living downstream from a large dam.

Transboundary Issues

As an international river, there have been serious issues on table with regard to the management and sharing of its water between India and Bangladesh. Besides several existing and proposed mega hydro-dams in the Sikkim-Darjeeling catchment, the Government of West Bengal has diverted almost entire Teesta Water via artificial canals at Teesta (Gajoldoba) Barrage in Jalpaiguri to irrigate its thirsty North Bengal leaving little or no water for Bangladesh. It has led to the glaring decline in the basin water in the lower catchment (Bangladesh) resulting in large-scale protests against India across the spaces of Bangladesh including Dhaka. Further, in the absence of reliable data and official agreement, technical issues regarding the quantity, division and share of the waters has become the bone of contention between India and Bangladesh. We need to understand that upstream water usage determines downstream options in water management and therefore sets the stage either for conflict or cooperation. In this regard, experts often project that the next 20- 25 years shall witness depressing intra and inter-State water disputes if policy makers both in India and Bangladesh do not come up with viable solutions for the sustainable management and sharing of Teesta Water.

Discussion and ways forward!

Many argue that the October 03- 04, 2023 disaster was a direct result of insufficient spillway capacity and failure to account for GLOF risks in the original dam design. There are concerns about the accountability of financial institutions that are bankrolling the reconstruction project, given the environmental and social risks involved. Many are also calling for the decommissioning of the dam altogether, citing the immense impact it has had on local communities and ecosystems including downstream impacts and ensure that appropriate measures are taken to minimize these effects and protect the environment and communities that depend on the river.

We need to take lessons from the largely human-made GLOF disaster of October 2023 and move ahead with caution taking into account the geologic and geomorphic specificities of the region.  There is now a common voice in the region – no more dams. Sikkim should now concentrate on the efficient handling of the already constructed and commissioned hydropower projects instead of venturing into new ones. There should be proper human coordination and an Early Warning System (EWS) in place to manage its functional dams. A small mistake upstream shall have tremendous human and environmental impacts downstream as it is a common river basin that we share in the Darjeeling hills, North Bengal plains and parts of northwest Bangladesh.  Sikkim needs to evolve a comprehensive regional hydropower policy in view of its unique regional environment, ecological setup and geography. Mainstreaming of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and climate change with hydropower policy also needs to be prioritised. There is also an urgent need to re-look India’s regional water management/ diplomacy strategy and neighbourhood policy.

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We have Bodoland University in Bodoland, Assam. Mamata Banerjee could have allowed DHU to be named as Gorkhaland University (GU) as a goodwill gesture, but she and her entire power corridors in Kolkata de-taste the very word ‘Gorkha or Gorkhaland’. Few years ago, I came across a momo shop called ‘Tibetan corner’ operated by a Gorkha person from Kalimpong in Tollygunj area (name changed), Kolkata. While having momo, I informally advised him to rename the shop as ‘Gorkha Corner’ as it would sound more relevant. He was scared and turned uncomfortable as many locals were also eating. He mildly told me, “daju, I feel insecure as a Gorkha, hence I identify myself as Tibetan here. It’s a business and survival strategy for me”. Constitutionally, Kolkata is equally ours as they feel Darjeeling hills is theirs.  

Why are we obsessed with such ludicrous names like ‘Green Field’ for Universities? They are sacred and valuable spaces often with historic vision and missions. We also have an airport called Greenfield Airport at Pakyong, Sikkim. In Sikkim we have Universities with names like Capital, Medhavi, Alpine, Skill, Professional etc.  Such names demean the very idea of a University and often give us the impression of two-rooms computer diploma centres of the mid-1990s in Darjeeling like APTEC, NIIT etc. We have so many luminaries and historical figures in the region, why can’t we have these universities in their names? This diploma-centre mentality of our policy makers also in one way or the other reflects their understanding and respect for higher education institutions. They should take out their time to tour and walk through the campuses of the Universities like JNU or BHU to internalise the very idea and concept of a University. The ‘diploma-centre mentality’ will only harm higher education system in the region.

Coming back to DHU, it carries the weight of expectation – to cater to the long-felt need for accessible and quality academic opportunities in a unique geographical and cultural landscape of Darjeeling hills and its surrounding. Students from the region often have to migrate to pursue higher education, facing geographical and financial hurdles. DHU’s establishment actually aims to bridge this gap by providing local youth with access to quality education closer to home. The university’s motto, ‘excellence. inclusion. innovation,’ reflects its commitment to academic rigor, catering to diverse student backgrounds, and fostering a culture of ground breaking research. Sounds good on paper! The reality is, however, quite different.

DHU, since it was established in 2021, has been functioning with the help of University of North Bengal and its affiliated colleges. To be blunt, part-timers are running the academic and administrative affairs of Darjeeling Hills University for the last three and half years.

The project of DHU has made mockery of the Gorkhas and higher education in the region. The PG-courses floated by DHU had been operating through online mode since their start till about few days ago, thanks to COVID19! It was only on April 09, 2024, DHU, reportedly, started its offline classes.

Not a single regular staff has been appointed by the Government of West Bengal so far! It has been functioning under the mercy of NBU and college teachers in and around the region. Why is there no full-time VC, Registrar, Finance Officer, Controller of Examinations, Librarians and faculty members in the university even after three years of its establishments. Why is the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, the custodian of well-being of Darjeeling hills, not pushing and putting pressure on the state government?

It’s sad that college teachers /staff members are now given additional charges to run the Darjeeling Hills University. University is not a college, it’s a different ecosystem.

It has bigger and far reaching objectives, missions and vision. Higher education in Darjeeling hills cannot be taken so lightly. Hill students cannot be taken on ride in this way! In Sikkim also they take higher education or education as a whole very lightly. In the state university of Sikkim, school teachers were deputed to teach MA courses few years ago. An Assistant Professor of a college was made registrar, controller etc. These are statutory positions equivalent to the post of secretary of a state. It requires decades of academic/administrative experiences to take up the responsibilities of these positions. It’s also important to understand that having NET/SLET does not mean we can bypass procedures to be appointed in a University. There are rules, regulations and protocols to be followed.  But babus up-there just do not bother. Their objective is just to grab power with little concern on the quality higher education. A simple question to the bureaucrats: Can an under-secretary be made chief secretary or even a secretary by-passing over a decade of experience?

It is sad and frustrating to record here that public at-large also show little or no concern on the state of higher education in the region while institutions like Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) is busy on construction and mining projects. It’s high time DHU becomes a full-fledged functional University with its own staff-members, teachers, campus and infrastructure. Public should rise in unity to make it fully functional. We need to take help of judiciary if things do not move.

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The event was part of the bigger research project entitled ‘Spring Rejuvenation for Water Security in Himalaya’ funded under National Mission on Himalayan Studies (NMHS), Government of India  and is being implemented across selected aspirational districts of Himalayan states in the country.

Darjeeling district is one of the aspirational districts selected for the purpose and Dr Vimal Khawas heads the Darjeeling chapter of the project . The project aims to develop a model ‘water sanctuary’ around a selected spring and undertakes many activities focussing on the rejuvenation of depleting water resource and its optimum management.

One of the major activities of the project has been to train series of young para-hydrogeologists who are also commonly called water ambassadors or jal doots  from the project area and its immediate surroundings over the period of three to four years. The objective is to produce a critical mass of trained youths who would appreciate and understand the significance of water resources, particularly natural springs, and subsequently work for their conservation and sustainable management in the region. The workshop provides basic knowledge of water resource followed by hands on training to understand critical parameters of water including the measurement spring discharge. 

The workshop trained more than 150 plus-two standard students of Griffiths Higher Secondary School drawn from the disciplines of Sciences and Humanities. Resource persons of the workshops included trained geographers including Dr Vimal Khawas, Dr D R Dahal (Asst Professor, Namchi Govt College) and Ms Suveccha Ghatani (Senior Research Scholar, Dept of Geography, Sikkim University). Senior civil society members, Mr Binod Dhanuki and Mr Dhondup Golay also graced the event and talked on ‘Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav’ and Importance of Afforestation, respectively. Headmaster of the historic Griffiths Higher Secondary School, Mr Bhim Pradhan, was kind enough to grace the workshop as special guest. The event was also joined by the esteemed faculty members of the school. The workshop was coordinated by Mr Kabindra Sharma, Project Fellow, under supervision of Dr Vimal Khawas, Principal Investigator and Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and Management.  

On the side-line of the event, a plantation drive was also carried out wherein about 50 biodiverse saplings were planted at the school premises to mark the importance of afforestation for rejuvenation of water resource.

Jubilant Para-hydrogeologists after successful completion of one day workshop on ‘Developing Cadre of para-hydrogeologists for Springshed Management’

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The state stopped issuing Inner Line Permits to foreign tourists from March 5, as per reports but did not restrict the movement of people from other states till March 16

Reportedly, Sikkim implemented a ban on tourists, both domestic and foreign, starting from March 16, 2020 after receiving notification from the government of India that all the border states should ban the entry of foreigners. However, the state stopped issuing Inner Line Permits (ILPs) to the foreign tourists from March 5, as per reports, but did not restrict the movement of people from other states till March 16. Sikkim also needs to be appreciated for its early start of thermal screening of persons entering the state at various entry points.

Some of the factors that has played a role in the safe passage of Sikkim and withholding of COVID19 virus beyond its southern border, so far, may briefly be summarised below:

Geographical location

Sikkim has greatly benefited from its geographical location. It represents a small piece of land that sits isolated above the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (West Bengal). It is internationally bordered by Bhutan, Tibet and Nepal in east, north, and west respectively. Its southern base shares a boundary with the state of West Bengal.

International borders bounding Sikkim are, anyway, always closed given its strategic location. Therefore, once the state’s border with West Bengal in its southern base was sealed in the third week of March, cross border demographic exchanges were completely halted. This was not the case with majority of other states of India where inter-state people’s movement has been going on till date. It is not possible to entirely seal bigger states of the country.

Small size of the state

Sikkim is the second smallest state in the country after Goa in terms of its geographical area, measuring just 7096 sq km. It is the smallest state in terms of its population registering only a little over 6 lakh as per the Census of India, 2011. The neighbouring Darjeeling district (including present Kalimpong) had recorded over 18-lakh population in the same year. There are many sub-divisions in the country with more population than that of Sikkim. Small size of the state has rendered Sikkimese polity and administration to orient and re-orient the state much faster and easier to achieve public consensus.

This again brings on table as to how smaller states can handle problems at hand timely, efficiently and effectively. Bigger states, on the other hand, have mostly made mess out of all critical problems including developments and disasters.

Sikkim has been a relatively disciplined state in comparison to many other states in the country. This is true concerning most of the Himalayan and Northeastern states of the country.

Swift, bold and timely decisions

Smaller size of the state has made lives of the decision-makers relatively easier in Sikkim unlike bigger states in the country where uncountable ideas/viewpoints and conflict of interests, not to talk of politics, have been recorded often negatively impacting the efficient decision making processes at this time of pandemic. Sikkim has, therefore, taken full advantage of its small population size and relatively homogenous public psyche by taking swift, bold and timely decisions. Timely decisions are very important at the time of disasters.

Public discipline

Sikkim has been a relatively disciplined state in comparison to many other states in the country. This is true concerning most of the Himalayan and Northeastern states of the country. Small population size, unique socio-economic and cultural features, peripheral location, complex historical antecedents and efficient decision-making process of the state have played notable role in this connection. It’s also important to highlight here that people living in the hills and mountains in general are comparatively soft, disciplined and law abiding souls unlike the so-called ‘mainstreamers’ who are vastly different than the hillians with regard to approaches and ways of lives.

Luck by chance

Last but not the least, Sikkim has been extremely lucky not to have recorded any COVID19 cases inside the state, so far, although sizable Sikkimese students and others reside outside the state for various reasons and who have been gradually returning home. The nearby Kalimpong district was not so lucky when its resident brought home COVID19 in the third week of March while she returned home from Chennai. After infecting several in the family and neighbourhood, the patient died on March 30, 2020, at North Bengal Medical College and Hospital.

Let’s hope and pray that this trend and pattern continue well into the future and Sikkim can keep itself safe and clean of COVID19 hazard.

To sum up, in the backdrop of extraordinary bio-disasters like COVID19, we need to undertake critical analysis of the ‘state of our resources and capabilities’ at our disposal at various levels- country, state, district and GPU. All disaster management plans should have a dedicated chapter on ‘Resources and Capability Analysis’, which needs to be revised periodically. Important sectors that need analysis may include health, education, administration, human resource, police and communication. This becomes important because the future is uncertain and newer disasters may hit us more frequently in the days to come. Changing global climate may bring about very many risks and challenges that are unheard of to humans at the moment.

At the moment, COVID19 has been our single most critical challenge to tackle upon. This pandemic has suddenly reminded us of the importance of the health sector and essential resources therein. It has blatantly exposed how our governments and policy planners have neglected this critical sector over the years. Sikkim is no exception in this regard. Someone has to map the geography of health infrastructure in Sikkim and show the policy makers the actual status of health in the state.

We should ask ourselves, why does every second Sikkimese prefer to visit Siliguri to secure her/his health?

This article was originally posted here.

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If we closely examine the current electoral landscape in the region, the pattern broadly looks as follows:

Clearly, chances of an independent candidate to emerge victoriously are slim to none, both because of their past political baggage and also due to the lack of their ability to create an adequate platform for grassroots mobilizations. Further, lesser political parties like, CPIM, BSP, IDRF, GRC and even national parties like INC may also not be able to wield much impact in the ensuing election due to both local and regional political dynamics.

Consequently, there are primarily two probable political scenarios to choose from before us for this election. Leaving aside political contenders highlighted above, the real fight is only between TMC (supported by GJMM2) and BJP (supported by GJMM1 and GNLF).

Scenario #1:

If we vote for TMC and make them victorious, there is a very high degree of probability that Mamata Banerjee would gradually grab the entire region under her fold. This election is just a gateway for Mamata and her party TMC to bigger political shares in the region via MLA and GTA elections, subsequently. The steady increase of TMC domination in the hills also means steady uprooting and waning of Gorkha identity and Gorkha political aspirations. They are inversely related to each other.

Under such a situation, in a decade or two, the entire notion of Gorkha and Gorkhaland may have been rendered irrelevant! We may be only referred to as a Thapa, a Chettri, a Bhujel, a Damai, a Rai, a Kami, a Sherpa, a Limbu, a Lepcha, a Bahun, a Dukpa, a Sarki, a Newar or Nepalis and many times immigrant Nepalis. We would, most probably, cease to be the Gorkhas. No one would have the guts to utter ‘Jai Gorkha’. We all may collectively and/or forcefully be made to chant ‘Jai Bangla’.

She is already on her way up the hills with a number of detrimental political cards. Her Development Board approach is one of the ways forward in this regard. She would never go for such appeasement politics had she loved the region and its people, to the extent of dividing the Gorkhas into ethnic lines. More importantly, TMC’s unscientific and draconic handling of the 2013 and 2017 Gorkhaland agitation/uprising is yet another critical example of how it perceives the Gorkhas and their long pending aspirations in the region.

Scenario #2:

If we vote for BJP and render them victorious, nothing may happen. The last 10 years were rather fruitless and going by that trend, the next five years may not bear fruit, either.BJP may be busy spreading its political and strategic tentacles across geographical spaces of the country with its Hindutva card. It may keep on struggling to take control of Bengal but without any notable results. BJP would not give us Gorkhaland! They have their state government in Assam. Has Bodoland been able to see the light of the day?

This MP would, in all likelihood remain a mere puppet within the larger framework and schemes of Bharatiya Janata Party!

However, the Gorkhas will have the freedom to shout ‘Jai Gorkha’ and ‘We want Gorkhaland’ under BJP unlike under TMC which is fundamentally and ideologically against the idea of Gorkha and Gorkhaland! And yes Gorkhas would, at least, have the hope to have their own separate state called ‘Gorkhaland’ or to be known by any other name someday.

Sapana nai bhaye pani haami dekhneh chau ra dekhi rahaneh chau

The choice is ours, to opt for scenario #1 or #2. No one shall force us.

Concluding Note:

The unscientific, unorganized and premature conclusion of 2017 Gorkha uprising has deeply lowered the self-respect and dignity of the entire Gorkha community. It may be difficult to reinstate our old glory in the foreseeable future unless we unite and stay united. For the first time, I feel insecure to wear a T-shirt that reads ‘I support Gorkhaland’ even in Kalimpong, not to talk of Siliguri.

For me ‘Entry of TMC into Darjeeling Politics is beginning of the end of Gorkha Political Aspirations’

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According to eyewitnesses, the brawl started when a group of men, reportedly, demanded ‘GT (Gunda Tax)’ from the purchaser of a piece of land. When the purchaser confronted the group and denied paying demanded GT, he was beaten black and blue and had to be hospitalized. The group didn’t stop there and created a ruckus in Oodlabari Bazar later. Eventually, locals joined hand to thrash the rogues, before police arrived to rescue the group and normalize the situation. The area has been under strict police vigilance since then to take care of any potential untoward events that may turn quickly communal.

Discussion with the locals on the issue shed light to the fact that there has been a gradual upsurge of settlers from outside the region, and now they dominate the periphery of Oodlabari town, particularly the riverine belt of Gish ‘Khola’. The area used to be open and vacant earlier. Locals do not know where do these new immigrants come from and who encourages them to inhabit the bank of the river. Their numbers are, however, steadily increasing over time. They occupy such vulnerable riverine belts that are normally abandoned by the locals. One of the advantages of occupying such risk-prone land is that the moment river water/floods damage their huts, state government immediately comes forward to help them, provide with shelter and food.

In the neighbouring Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), too, it is disturbing to witness sprouting informal huts along the NH10 between Rangpo and Kalijhora. The stretch between Melli and Teesta Bazar is particularly worrisome where around 70 new hutments have come up in the area, recently. Reportedly, new settlements have also been noticed around Tista bazar and across pockets of Kalimpong town.

Duars the Gateway to Bhutan, Northeast India and Beyond

Duar, which also means ‘door’, ‘passage’ in Assamese, Bengali, Nepali, Maithili, Bhojpuri, Magahi and Telugu languages, has historically formed a gateway to Bhutan, Northeast India and South East Asia. Duars are also commonly referred to as Dwars or Dooars. Situated at an altitude ranging from 90m to 300m, they represent floodplains and foothills of the Eastern Himalaya around Bhutan.

Bengal Duars, politically, borders the foothills of Darjeeling district east of Tista River, entire Jalpaiguri and Alipurduar districts and the upper region of Cooch Behar district in West Bengal. The region is noted for varied forms of bio-resources and ethnic diversity. It is also known for tea gardens that were planted by the British. The region, generally, is composed of numerous tribal groups, including Bodos, Rabha, Mech, Toto, Tamang/murmi, Koch, Limbus, Lepcha, Rajbongshis and Adivasis who were brought in to man the tea plantations by the British. Considerable numbers of Bengalis (mostly displaced/relocated from erstwhile East Pakistan) also live in the region.

The region has been historically important both in terms of socio-culture connections and geopolitical strategies. This region is a melting pot of ethnic diversity. It is dynamic in nature and evolving with time.

The gradual demographic shift in Bengal Duars

After partition in 1947, Bengali refugees came in large numbers and settled in North Bengal. Although the Indo-Bangladesh border is a closed border and free movement of citizens are not allowed, there has been a massive and steady influx of Bangladeshi immigrants into the region after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. However, the real problem has been that nobody knows the precise number of informal migrants.

According to Professor A K M Anwaruzzaman of Aliah University, ‘11,700,000 refugees arrived in India from East Pakistan propelled by the partition of India in 1947 and Jalpaiguri witnessed 48.27% growth rate during 1951-61. Further, triggered by war of independence of Bangladesh in 1971, 10 million Bangladeshis, mainly hindus took shelter in West Bengal. Large number of Bangladeshi refugees settled in Jalpaiguri district as a result’.

As early as in the 1980s, TV Rajeswar, former IB director and former governor of the state, had written and cautioned against heavy infiltration into West Bengal from Bangladesh.

In 2012, then Darjeeling District Congress secretary, Dilip Pradhan pointed that ‘all the people from Terai-Dooars who are against the formation of Gorkhaland are Bangladeshis. He alleged that North Bengal alone accommodates 30 lakh Bangladeshi nationals who often try to create a disturbance by planning various schemes. The state government is sheltering Bangladeshi immigrants and making them its vote bank, which is a problem for the nation as a whole’.

According to Government of India, there were around two crore Bangladeshi immigrants staying illegally in India in 2016. The figure was almost 67 % higher over 1.2 crore estimate given by UPA government in 2004. UPA government had estimated 57 lakh Bangladeshi squatters in West Bengal, the highest among the states at that point followed by Assam with 50 lakh.

It may be noted that Bangladeshi nationals do not cross the border into India in sudden spurts in recent times, as they did earlier in the wake of partition. They are now coming in a slow, steady trickle, in groups of 10-20 across the porous Indo-Bangladesh border. Statistical data shows that by 1987 there were 49.50 lakhs Bangladeshis in West Bengal covering all the districts of the state. Reportedly, close to 50 Bangladeshis cross over to West Bengal every day.

A closer examination of the demographic data hints that poor economic conditions at the source and search for better economic pastures in the host region have traditionally been the forces behind this informal immigration. However, it is also clear that successive West Bengal Governments have also encouraged and sanctioned the informal immigration of the Bangladeshi nationals into the region as guaranteed ‘vote bank’.

In the past four decades, the decadal population growth in the region has remained at nearly 40 per cent. Given the relatively small size of the original population, this kind of population explosion is simply not possible naturally. Unchecked cross-border immigration from Bangladesh is, therefore, contributing to this large population growth in the region. Such a situation is gradually destroying the dynamic socio-cultural, economic and political fabric of the region.

It then comes as a no surprise that the percentage share of hill populace in Darjeeling district has also continuously gone down over the years. The share was around 72% in 1951; it went down to 65% by 1961, 54% by 1981, and 49% by 2011.

Demographic Shifts: Darjeeling Hills vs Plains population share changes

If this trend continues, then the hills populace will fast become a minority in their own region.

Ironically, West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee, recently, even threatened Prime Minister Narendra Modi to dare touch a Bangladeshi let alone repatriating her/him to Bangladesh.

Chicken-neck, informal migration and national security apprehensions for India

The eastern border considered safe since the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, has become a thick long red line for India. Due to the porous borderline between India and Bangladesh large-scale informal immigration from Bangladesh continues unabated. It has been estimated that about 2 lakh Bangladeshis cross the border annually and settle in West Bengal.

The entire Darjeeling-Duar region is very strategically located. It shares borders with three countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal and a few km away with China at Jelep la, making it the only region in India with four international borders. The proverbial ‘chicken-neck’ corridor also often called ‘Siliguri Corridor’ that roughly stretches 200 kilometres in length with breath varying between 25 – 60 kilometres is an integral part of the region. The chicken-neck connects India’s Northeast region with the rest of India, Nepal and Bangladesh lying on either side of the corridor. The kingdom of Bhutan lies on the northern side of the corridor. It is a very sensitive geographical piece of land and is heavily patrolled by the Indian Army, the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force and the West Bengal Police.

Informal immigrants from Bangladesh to cross over to India in the last 50 years have often used this Corridor. In fact, as early as in 2002, there were reports that highlighted how the ‘Siliguri corridor’ was being used as a supply route by Pakistani ISI to provide arms and ammunition via Bangladesh to insurgents in the North East. It has today become one of the most porous border regions of India through which antinational elements operate freely.

According to Amitava Mukherjee, noted journalist and commentator, ‘attempt to give citizenship to Bangladeshi illegal immigrants may seriously jeopardize the political, social and economic life of the country as well as its security scenario too. West Bengal or the northeastern Indian states can no longer accommodate the Bangladeshis. So neither Mamata Banerjee nor any other political party should tinker with such an explosive situation’.

Fugitive, Gorkha Janmukti Morcha leader Bimal Gurung has also warned against informal Bangladeshi settlements in Darjeeling foothills and Dooars region in a recent press release. He has alleged that the state government is ‘secretly measuring land to settle illegal Bangladeshis expected to be removed from Assam’.

The ongoing Doklam tangle between India, China and Bhutan further reiterates and reestablishes the importance of ‘Chicken Neck Corridor’ in the national security framework and we need to take the situation seriously. Since the 1962 war with China, Indian strategists have envisioned a future scenario where the Chinese may simply bypass and drop Special Forces to choke vulnerable Siliguri Corridor and cut off Northeast India.

Any disruption to the ‘chicken neck’ may bring entire Northeast India to the brink of scarcity, as it is primarily dependent on the rest of the country for essential food items. As early as in 1998, the region used to import goods – including food grain, pulses, salt, sugar, edible oil, cement and fertilizers among other things – worth nearly INR 2000 crore annually from the rest of India.

Urgent need for serious research, thinking and debate

In the interest of the larger national security concerns of the country, there is, therefore, an urgent need to delve deeper to examine seriousness of the situation, which could quickly turn into a national security nightmare. Given the porous border that India shares with Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, this proverbial “chicken neck” is under a constant threat of being strangled by forces inimical to India.

Resettlement of Bangladeshi refugees and massive informal migration in the strategically located Darjeeling-Dooars region in the last 50-60 years has seriously compromised the security of the nation, as well as the security and well-being of the indigenous people of the region.

The entire Gorkhaland Territorial Administration region has been witnessing increasing ethnic upheavals in recent times particularly in the last five years and is, therefore, very sensitive to any new settlements being facilitated to inhabit the area. The Gorkhas’ protest of 2017 in the Darjeeling-Duars region against the highhandedness of the West Bengal government is a clear indication that the region has to be handled with utmost care.

There are legitimate fears among certain sections of local intellectuals that unchecked informal immigration is setting grounds for ‘human insecurity’ of the locals in this sensitive border region.

The policymakers, therefore, need to critically question, examine and research this dangerous and persisting scenario in the region in the light of further marginalization of an already marginalised Gorkha and Adivasi communities and more importantly from the perspective of national security and integrity of the country.

*Dr Vimal Khawas is Associate Professor and Head, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and Management, Central University of Sikkim, Gangtok (Sikkim)

[Article was originally posted in Sikkim Express and OpIndia]

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The Concept of Development Board and Gorkha Temptation

The idea of cultural and development board was initially mooted to protect the socio-cultural and economic interests of the Lepchas in the proposed Gorkhaland region. But the idea was little different at that point of time.  It started with ‘Mayel Lyang Lepcha Development Board’ in 2013 followed by ‘Tamang Development Board’ in 2014 and ‘Bhutia Development Board’ in 2015.

From amongst the larger Gorkha community, Limbu and Tamang were the first groups to aspire for a development board of their own. Gorkhas, particularly younger lots, saw money flowing through these boards and could not resist their temptation.  Soon after, almost all sub-Gorkha groups started to make noise, like seasonal insects, for the ‘boards’ of their own, forgetting and more pertinently disregarding the larger collective Gorkha aspiration of separate state.

 Perfect Recipe to dislocate Gorkha Unity and their Collective Voice

Mamata Banerjee immediately understood and internalized that the very idea and concept of ‘Board’ was the perfect recipe to tackle the dejected Gorkhas and a critical card of the moment to dislocate and dismantle the bigger political aspiration of separate Gorkhaland state. Consequently, she took full advantage of the situation.

Eventually, by the end of 2017, 15 odd ‘Development and Cultural Boards’ were formed for the Lepcha, Bhutia and Gorkha Communities of the proposed Gorkhaland region. Not surprisingly, Government of West Bengal yet again notified another development board called ‘The West Bengal Terai, Dooars, Siliguri Development and Cultural Board (Gorkha community)’ on August 13, 2018 making a total of 16 development boards. While the first 15 boards have been formed on communal line, the last one is based on geography.

“Boards Boards Everywhere – Not a development to be seen”

Some critical reflections

• Development Boards are, fundamentally, NGOs without any teeth. They are registered under The West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 and may be dissolved in accordance with the provisions under section 24 and 27 the said Act. All the members are nominated and removed by the government of West Bengal.
• Development boards, ironically, are expected to be multi-tasking agencies. Very ambitiously, they aim to act as peace broker, research institute, development agent, museum and archival center, contractor, conservator of traditions, heritage and language, protector of the environment and many others. Sadly, they do not have the capacity and expertise to fulfill most of the objectives set forth by them.
• Barring few like Lepcha and Bhutia Boards, almost all the development boards are breakaway faction of their parent organisation/association. They target youth wing of their traditional community organisations and vehemently permeate the philosophy of divide and rule policy. They have divided the fragile, dynamic and evolving Gorkha community and have done irreparable damage to the social fabric of larger Gorkha identity.
• Development boards have not been formed under Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) but under other departments of the Government of West Bengal (see the table) and therefore are not answerable to GTA. Such an arrangement often creates conflict of powers and interests between the boards and GTA. Consequently, bigger interests of the Gorkhas have been sabotaged with the formation of development boards based on communities.
• Mamata Banerjee now uses development boards to mobilize the often poor and gullible Gorkhas in-order to support interests of her party in the hills and Tarai/Duars. The task now has become exceeding easy for her. She just calls on the 16 heads of the Boards and the entire Gorkhaland, Duars and Terai are mobilised! With the formation of 16 parallel development boards, she has now almost made Gorkhaland Territorial Administration an irrelevant and defunct entity. More recently, critics have been increasingly questioning the validity of GTA in the presence of so many development boards in the region

Lastly, but not the least, West Bengal’s project of ‘Development and Cultural Board’ in Darjeeling and Duars region is nothing but a populist approach to appease people on communal line. It will eventually fragment and divide the Gorkha society in the long run and will not address the fundamental issues for which Gorkhas have been collectively fighting for more than 110 years.

 *Dr. Vimal Khawas is the Head of the Department, Peace and Conflict Studies, Sikkim Central University.

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MEGHALAYA
Meghalaya was formed by carving out two districts from the state of Assam: theUnited Khasi Hills and Jaintia Hills, and the Garo Hills on 21 January 1972. Before attaining full statehood, Meghalaya was given semi-autonomous status in 1970.

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At about 8 am in the morning before I was free of my morning chores, a voice Jai Goraknath greeted me. He was the same man who produced series of uncanny sounds in the midnight. He had come to collect the fruit of his wakeful service. I secretly made up my mind to explore the significance of his midnight venture and few other associated details. Our conversation enlightened me with some interesting ethno-cultural information of which I was debarred from, all these years. 

Jogi-s or what people also locally address them, as Pheriwala-s across Darjeeling-Sikkim Hills and Nepal is one of the ethnic groups belonging to a larger Nepali/Nepalese community. They believe themselves to be the loyal disciples of Lord Shiva or what they also call Goraknath. They have a total of 64 bhairungs (sub-tribe) out of which only 12 bhairungs are entitled to be pheriwalas. Meaning thereby, only 12 sub-tribe of Jogi are culturally given to practice this customary duty. Therefore, all Pheriwalas are Jogis but not all Jogis are Pheriwalas.

It was Lord Shiva who sent them to this world, as Goraknath knew the world is featured with innumerable evil spirits. As the loyal disciples of Goraknath it is their duty to protect human beings from the evil spirits characterising the world. In this connection they set out for their rounds in the mid-night as it is believed that evil spirits are active during the period. They visit every household in a village or a particular region and blow Sankha Dhoni with the help of a horn of an animal locally called brat (an animal belonging to deer family). In the process they produce a series of uncanny sounds supported by spiritual mantras often hard to decipher by an ordinary soul. One Pheriwala visits one pre-demarcated village/region. There is no overlap in the performance i.e. no two pheriwalas perform in the same village in a same night. There are, however, cases when two pheriwalas perform collectively. In that, one of them would be a junior or a disciple who would be learning the lessons of pheri phuknu (blow) and the associated mantras from his senior or master. 

Pheriwalas usually perform their age-old customary duty during chayit roughly corresponding the months of mid March – mid April and Kartik i.e. mid October- mid November. They believe evil spirits are most active during these two periods and as the ardent disciples of Goraknath they are bound to protect the human beings from their evil objective of negatively influencing the everyday human life. 

They collect alms or what they also call it daan the very next morning from the individual households of the village/region where they perform. They do so for the nau grah santi (peace to the nine planets of the solar system) of the members of the households. They believe, they have the power to carry along with them all the planetary problems of human being inflicted upon by different locations of nine planets revolving around the solar system. They offer sacrifice to their Sankha Dhoni to keep their instrument active and effective for the cause. The sacrifice is usually offered during the Nepali/Nepalese calendar of asthami or noami.

Superstitious it may sound pheri phuknu is one of the important ethno-religio-spiritual attributes in force across both rural and urban spaces since time immemorial. Rustic hill folks often wonder as to why Pheriwala did not visit their houses if, by chance, a particular village or a region is left out during the period. It is strongly imbibed within the culture of Nepali speaking households across Darjeeling, Sikkim, and Nepal. 

Further, Jogis also play a role of traditional ethno-spiritual faith healers. There are numerous instances when the people to heal their ailments have called them. Examples abound across the hills of Darjeeling and Sikkim where Jogis have cured paralysis, epilepsy and other forms of diseases.

Nevertheless, the present young generation Jogis and those that are yet to come may not be quite interested to carry forward this odd profession. Jogis themselves feel that they have been gradually deviating from their historico-cultural attribute over the period of time. Education and other associated postmodern forces have been playing important role in this connection. Truly, as the whole of human species is entangled in the process of development, Jogis/Pheriwalas cannot be an exception. Pheri Phuknu, apart from being a ritual, custom and tradition of Pheriwalas, is one of the prominent ethno-religious assets of the larger Nepali/Nepalese community. We must not lose this asset as we proceed ahead in the spectrum of development dynamics.

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